This study argues that the euro area more than doubled trade among its members, but this process was delayed and fitful. The estimates in this paper are close to those obtained by Rose and Frankel in spite of using the methods developed by their critics. Furthermore, the euro area has increased the trade of its Mediterranean members more than the trade of other member states; it also raised trade with non-members by some 35 per cent. The paper innovates mainly by using a more appropriate control group to the euro area and better controls for the Single Market, estimating differences of trade, studying the effects of the euro on different member states, using quantile regression, and naturally by using more recent data.
Introduction
The euro area is in crisis since 2010. As sovereign debts of member states spiral and an increasing number of them have required bail outs critics pointed to the costs of this project and raised doubts about the usefulness of a common currency in Europe. Many scholars agree that the reasons for establishing Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) have always been mainly political (Sadeh and Verdun, 2009 ). However, the economic cost-benefit analysis remains important because it helps shape the political debate by either putting a price tag on the project or showing it to pay for itself. After all, EMU advocates have long promised economic gains from a single currency, and this promise was important in gaining public support for the euro, at least until the current crisis. In short, the economic cost-benefit analysis of the single currency is an important part of its larger political-economic debate.
The costs of a single currency are mainly macroeconomic (giving up monetary and exchange rate policy). The microeconomic benefits are expected mainly from expanded trade. The classic Mundellian theoretical argument is that trade expands following the elimination of the trade barrier inherent in exchange rate fluctuations and currency conversion transaction costs. This is obvious enough as a direct effect, but there should also be dynamic trade-enhancing effects to a currency union. First, in a globalized world where components cross borders many times before being assembled and sold as a final good, even a small reduction in transaction costs can increase trade flows nonlinearly. Second, by reducing collusion among competitors a currency union can eliminate pricing mark-ups and enhance trade (Baldwin, 2006) . Third, currency unions can increase the number of firms engaged in international trade because they reduce the fixed costs associated with this trade and allow smaller firms to participate, thus increasing variety-driven trade (Melitz, 2003; Helpman et al., 2008; Baldwin, 2010) .
This study focuses on the benefit side of the euro, arguing that the euro more than doubled trade among the member states, and increased trade among the Mediterranean countries more than among other member states; it also raised trade with non-members by some 35 per cent. This effect is not observed in the euro's early years, which helps explain why it was difficult to detect so far. The estimates in this paper are compatible with the variety trade argument, but in their magnitude are much closer to the estimates found in the works of Andrew Rose and Jeffrey Frankel (see next section) than to the estimates found by their critics, even when the methods developed by the critics are used.
The paper innovates over the existing literature on the euro's trade effects by simultaneously using a more appropriate control group to the euro area, better controls for the Single Market (SM), controlling for trade with third parties, properly treating the gravity equations' omitted variables problem, and using unidirectional trade flows rather than bilateral average flows; while different studies applied some of these measures none have applied all of them. On top of this the study innovates by estimating differences of trade, studying the effects of the euro on different member states, using quantile regression, and naturally by using more recent data.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the literature on the euro's trade effects. The third section lays out the research design, the fourth section reports the results of a few techniques used to estimate merchandise trade among 22 countries during 1991-2011; these include fixed effects regression and regressing trade differences. The fifth section explores the different euro effects on Mediterranean and non-Mediterranean countries using trade differences and quantile regression. The sixth section provides conclusions.
The long hunt for the euro's effect
An intensive debate developed in the past decade among trade economists following Rose's (2000) and Frankel and Rose's (2002) finding that currency unions triple trade among their member states. The Rose Effect, as it became known, can be identified when a gravity equation is run on a very large dyadic dataset with some 180 countries over the recent 50 or 60 years.
1 Large trade effects for currency unions were obtained with similar datasets by Frankel (2010) , Gil-Pareja et al. (2008) , Glick and Rose (2002) and Tenreyro and Barro (2003) . Other studies based on shorter periods of data and smaller groups of countries tended to arrive at much more modest estimates, typically finding that euro area membership increased trade between member states by 5-15 per cent. 2 Baldwin et al. (2008, 42) could find no more than a two per cent effect.
The vast differences in these estimates resulted from a number of empirical problems, most of which can be broadly classified as either control group problems or 1 There is no scope here to explain the theoretical background of the Gravity model. See Baldwin et al. (2008, 10-7) for a very detailed exposition.
2 See Chintrakarn (2008) , Flam and Nordström (2003; 2006) and Micco et al. (2003) .
Within this group of studies Baldwin et al. (2005) produced an outlying result of as much as 80 per cent euro's effect by assuming a convex sensitivity of trade to exchange rate risk.
endogeneity problems (See Table 1 ). Starting with control group problems, any estimate of the euro's effect depends greatly on the countries and the periods with which the euro area is compared. Ideally scholars should measure the euro's effect on trade by recording trade levels in the years following the launch of the single currency and then rewinding history and observing trade levels under separate national currencies. Because this is impossible scholars need a control group -a group of countries that did not join the euro area but that would have similarly responded to the launch of the euro had they joined it.
Without a properly selected control group the average treatment effect (of joining the euro area) on the trade of randomly selected countries will differ from the average treatment effect on the treated countries (those that actually joined the euro area), and it is the latter that is of relevance (Baier and Bergstrand, 2009, 64) .
Two other variants of the control group problem arise when the dataset is based on either too few euro area member states (Tenreyro and Barro, 2003) or too few noneuro countries (Baldwin et al., 2008, 39-42) , which leads to low external validity, trying to infer from the experience of a few member states on a more general case.
Defining the treatment group is also important. The estimated euro's effect is biased when a single dummy accounts for all currency unions. Rose-type datasets involve many tiny very poor and authoritarian countries. How relevant is their experience to rich, modern, European democracies, with reliable trade data, and respect for individual property rights and the principle of free trade (Egger et al., 2008, 281) ? Since European Union (EU) member states tend to have diversified economies with long-established trade-supporting institutions and legislation they are ceteris paribus more inclined to trade than most other countries. Including them in a dataset with many low-trading countries sets a very low baseline for trade and any variable that singles them out will have a large coefficient. Indeed when Chintrakarn (2008) and Persson (2001) used matching techniques to mimic a controlled experiment they estimated the currency unions' trade effect to be respectively 8 per cent or nil.
Then there are longitudinal control group problems. These involve using a dataset dominated by distant eras, when trade levels were lower ceteris paribus (Frankel, 2010) .
And it is hard to believe that the gravity equation's coefficients should have remained stable over such a long and eventful period, which was characterized by accelerated technological change. Many studies are also disadvantaged with too few post-euro years in the dataset, or too few pre-euro years.
Nearly all studies also failed to control for trade between members and nonmembers of a currency union. In such studies the null group consists not only of trade between non-member countries, but also of trade with third parties; the euro's effect is thus under estimated.
Turning to the endogeneity problem in studies of the euro's effect on trade, one source of endogeneity lies with gravity-related variables that are either hard to measure or hard to instrument and are therefore often omitted. Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) and Baldwin et al. (2008, 39-42) all studies of the euro's trade effect failed to specify such particular fixed effects. Two specific processes related to the Single Market may have biased estimates of the euro's effect. First, VAT fraud may have caused intra-EU imports to be significantly underreported in the run up to the euro's introduction, and attempts to deal with this problem overlapped the 1999-2002 euro-introduction period. So part of the rise in official trade numbers after the lunch of the euro had to do with better enforcement of the VAT system. Second, the introduction of the Pan-European Cumulation System (PECS) in 1997, which simplified rules of origin in the EU, also broadly coincided with the launch of the euro (Baldwin, 2006) .
The task of separating the euro's effect from the Single Market's effect is especially difficult in datasets with too few post-euro observations or too few non-euro EU member states (Chintrakarn, 2008) . In addition, the Single Market's effect on trade is dynamic because of the continuous EU legislation and the different speed of transposition of directives in different member states (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007, 80) . However, legislation and transposition in the EU are hard to control for because they may be endogenous to trade (i.e. member states may be more or less interested in pursuing them depending on their trade performance). Various studies tried to capture the Single
Market's dynamism but ended with an implausibly small and insignificant Single Market effect (Baldwin et al., 2008, 34-42; Berger and Nitsch, 2005; Gil-Pareja et al., 2008) . .
In addition to control group and endogeneity problems there are technical problems in studying the euro's effect on trade. One such problem is that many studies took the average of the two-way bilateral trade flow for their dependent variables instead of using the unidirectional trade flow. This unnecessary aggregation led to loss of information and made estimates less accurate. Many of these studies also used the logarithmic transformation of the average flow rather than average the logarithmic transformation of each flow as would be consistent with the gravity equation's theory (Baldwin et al., 2008, 15; Pakko and Wall, 2001) . Another technical problem is the dropping of zero trade observations (up to 30 per cent of observations in Rose-type data sets) by some scholars (Santos-Silva and Tenreyro, 2006; Tenreyro, 2010) . Finally, none of the studies seemed to be concerned about specifying stationary variables (such as EYFE and IYFE) with non-stationary variables (such as trade) and time-invariant variables (such as distance) in a single regression, which can result in spuriously significant estimates and exaggerated R 2 .
Research design
Based on the insights of the previous section the chosen dataset period is 1991-2011. This period includes the latest reliable trade data, balances between pre-euro and post-euro years, and starts after the break in the trade series that followed German unification. Selecting countries for the euro group (the treatment group) and for the control group is more complicated. Countries with a population of less than one million (including for example Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta) are not included in this study because their economies are not sufficiently diversified and their trade data may be distorted by a small number of major transactions (but Luxembourg's data is aggregated with Belgium's). This leaves us with 145 countries The euro group obviously includes the countries that have adopted the single currency, but not Estonia, Slovakia and Slovenia because they have been members of the euro area for only a few years, and because their trade data is affected by the major political and economic restructuring that they underwent in the 1990s, in a way that sets them apart from other euro area member
states. This leaves eleven euro area member states to be matched by eleven non-euro countries (the control group).
The control group is constructed using the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method. However, rather than matching country-pairs, as done in Persson (2001) and Chintrakarn (2008) , each euro area country is matched with a non-euro country. The reason for this is that PSM involves a logit regression (see below) and in a dyadic dataset with a euro area membership dummy as a dependent variable, the observations are not independent of one another (if countries A, B and C are all members in a currency union then the B-C observation is dependent on the A-B and A-C observations). 5 PSM seems appropriate because the treatment group is fixed (there are only eleven euro area countries) and cannot be enlarged by applying other matching methods at the cost of poorer covariate balance between the treated and control groups (King et al., 2011) . Persson (2001, 439, 447) and Chintrakarn (2008) select for the control group country-pairs that "…in the absence of a common currency would on average trade with the same intensity"; thus, they use the conventional gravity variables. However, their dyadic variables (such as distance) cannot be used to select from a panel of countries.
Output, another gravity variable, can be measured on a national basis of course, but output varies greatly among the euro area member states so does not characterize them.
There is no conventionally agreed theory as to why the euro area in particular was established (Sadeh and Verdun, 2009 ). This has led Eichengreen (2010) to conclude that the euro area is Sui Generis. Thus, rather than trying to explain the euro area this study selects for the control group countries that if subject to the same treatment (joining the euro area) would on average trade with the same intensity as the actual euro area member states. In other words, we are seeking criteria that can affect the euro's trade effect, not necessarily the base level of trade. Crucially, these criteria must be exogenous to membership in the euro area.
The eleven countries in the treatment group are characterized by being members of the EU's Single Market, committed to the principle of free trade (as reflected in their long standing membership in GATT/WTO), and not having a legacy of Communism and transition to a market economy; they are rich but not extremely rich and have no dominant oil sector. The particular range of non-oil income per capita that characterizes euro countries is relevant because it is associated with a certain capital intensity of their economies, which in turn is associated with comparative advantage in distinct industries; their particular range of income also affects the type of products consumed. Another common feature of the euro countries is low women fertility, which is associated with great participation in the labour market, high education and a sophisticated civil society.
Accordingly, the following three variations of a logistic regression were run on a crosssection of 145 countries with a population exceeding one million 6 :
6 The dataset is cross-sectional because the timing of the launch of EMU had little to do with income and fertility, or any other national-specific variable (other than Germany 7 A communist/transition legacy could not be specified in the regression because it perfectly predicts membership in the euro area. Membership in the Single Market does not perfectly predict membership in the euro area because Austria and Finland joined it only in 1994 (see more below).
(1), or 26,802 Dollars in Column (2), and decreases for higher or lower levels of income.
The regression in Column (1) is chosen for fitting propensity scores because of its high pseudo R 2 but the regression in Column (2) shows how strong the other criteria are in characterizing membership in the euro area, and the one in Column (3) shows that a simpler logarithmic relationship between income and euro membership is inferior in characterizing the euro countries. In order to demonstrate the usefulness of a properly selected control group of countries a smaller dataset restricted to the EU member states is also used. Some scholars justify such a small dataset on the grounds that EU membership may have very complex 8 Compare this pseudo R 2 with 0.70 in Bergstrand (2004), 0.49 in Persson (2001, 440) , and no more than 0.41 in Egger et al. (2008, 286) . 9 The null hypothesis of similar means in the control and treatment groups can be rejected only at p = 0.33 for income and at p = 0.13 for fertility.
and unquantifiable trade effects beyond membership of the Single Market (Baldwin et al., 2008, 21) . The EU and the euro area may be Sui Generis, incomparable to other experiences.
The dependent variable is the natural logarithmic transformation of annual nominal USD merchandise exports from one country to another, taken from the UN's The euro more than doubled its members' trade Table 3 presents results from a simple specification that is common to many euro- would have been without the euro. In the small dataset (Column (3)) the effect rises to 344 per cent. With the Single Market index the euro's effect in the large dataset is estimated at 32 per cent in Column (2) and disappears altogether in Column (4). Table 3 also demonstrates that without a properly selected control group of countries (i.e. in the small EU14 dataset) the euro effect is prone to exaggeration in either direction. The euro's effect on trade with third parties is roughly one half the magnitude of its effect on trade among the member states.
The Single Market index is a more sophisticated variable than a plain Single
Market dummy but using it along with a dummy for euro area membership may lead to an underestimation of the euro's trade effect, because the euro's effect on trade is assumed to be fixed over time, and all of the dynamism in European integration is captured by the Single Market index. In order to arrive at correct estimates of the euro's effect on trade, some dynamism must be allowed in monetary integration too. In addition, trade is a non-stationary variable, as are the dummies for membership in the euro area, the dummies for membership in the Single Market, and the Single Market index; no country has left either of the blocks and the number of regulations only rises with time.
Thus, it is possible that the estimates reported in Table 3 are spuriously significant.
In order to correct these problems table 4 runs the differences of the log of trade on the differences of both euro area membership dummies (with members and with nonmembers). The membership differences have a value of 1 only in 1999 (2001 for Greece) and zero in all other years. Thus, the coefficients of these differences reflect the changes to trade as a result of the entry to the euro area. Seven lags to the differenced euro dummies are specified, each showing the trade effect in a particular year following entry to the euro area. For example the 7 th lag represents the effect on trade in 2006 (2008 for Greece). Further lags were not possible because specifying each lag omits one year from the beginning of the dataset and specifying an 8 th lag would omit the crucial year 1999. In order to find out whether the coefficients merely reflect the members pre-existing tendency to trade, rather than a causal effect of the euro, a lead was specified as well.
The four columns in Table 4 correspond to the four columns in Table 3 . Columns Table 4 demonstrates that estimating the differences of trade rather than its levels reduces the sensitivity of the euro effect to the choice of dataset and to the choice of control method for the Single Market.
Interestingly the euro's effect over the years follows an uneven pattern, alternating from significant to insignificant coefficients. This can perhaps be explained by the euro area's macroeconomic effects, such as its business cycle, which the euro dummies inevitably capture along with the euro's microeconomic effect on trade. While the microeconomic effect can be expected to build up steadily, euro-related slowing of economic activity can mitigate it (or enhance it in boom years). Of course what matters in the practical world is the sum of these effects, which Table 4 measures, because one cannot enjoy the euro's microeconomic effects without being exposed to its macroeconomic effects.
11 These numbers are calculated by adding the coefficients of the different years for pairs of two Euro area member states since 2000, ignoring coefficients with p > .10. (2) and (4) (1)- (2) are based on a dataset of 22 countries, Column (3)- (4) are based on the smaller dataset of 14 EU member states. The data period is 1999-2010.
These results imply an even greater cumulative trade effect than the one reported in Table 3 . This could be explained perhaps by some fall in trade during the crisis years since 2008, for which year-specific coefficients are not estimated in Table 4 . Or it could mean that the euro's effect is stronger when measured against non-members' performance during its time, than when measured relative to the pre-euro's years (recall that the years 1991-1998 are dropped in Table 4 ). The exception is Column (3) where the sum of coefficients in Table 4 is about one half of the corresponding coefficient in Table   3 . This is further evidence that the euro's effect measured in Table 3 Column (3) is spurious, but so probably is the effect of the Single Market in Columns (2) and (4) of Table 3 , which 'robbed' the euro of its effect.
That any integration project takes time to result in enhanced trade should come as no surprise (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007, 80) . Trade integration often has delayed effects because firms and households take time to adjust to its evolving measures. Trade ties may be characterized by persistence and stickiness as a result of the costs of setting up distribution and service networks in the partner country (De Nardis and Vicarelli, 2003) .
Firms that want to take advantage of the reduced costs that a single currency offers need time to reorganize; and perhaps the practical preparations in 2001 for the changeover to euro notes and coins was more important than previously thought in convincing firms to engage in cross-border trade.
The euro increased trade in the Mediterranean more than elsewhere
The issuing of notes and coins made the euro more tangible for everyone, but must have been especially important in reducing the fixed costs of cross-border trade for small firms, which tend to conduct a larger share of their transaction in cash compared with large firms; it was similarly important for anyone preferring cash over other means of payments. This suggests that the euro may have asymmetrically affected the economies of the different member states according to the share that small firms make up of their production, and the tendency of their consumers to transact in cash.
Thus, in this study's last set of tests, the trade effects of the euro are allowed to vary among two groups of member states: the Mediterranean countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) plus Ireland (henceforth referred to simply as the Meds), and the other member states of the euro area (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands -the non-Meds). The Mediterranean economies are especially characterized by small businesses and cash transactions and thus can be expected to gain much from the introduction of the euro. Identifying the trade effects of the euro in the member states that received bail-outs is also interesting in light of these great efforts to keep them in the euro area. From an economic point of view, is it worth it? Hence Ireland is included in the Meds group. Table 5 breaks down the results from Table 4 according to these groups of member states. In order to save space the estimates for the coefficients of the Single Market index differences are again not reported as well as the coefficients for the differenced dummies for pairs of Euro member with non-member states (they are all similarly broken down by country groups). Across the two different datasets and the two different methods to control for the Single Market's effects Table 5 shows that the euro increased trade among the Meds more than it increased trade among the non-Meds Another method to control for different effects of the euro on the two groups of countries is quantile regression. Quantile regression estimates the coefficients so as to minimize errors around specified quantiles in the distribution of the dependent variable, rather than around its average as is the case with conventional regression. Thus, quantile regression can estimate the distinct set of coefficients and euro effect for observations with large trade flows and for those with small trade flows.
12 As in the interpretation of results in Table 4 this calculation ignores coefficients with p > .10 and starts from the 1 period lag. Note: See note to Table 4 . In addition, coefficients for differenced dummies for pairs of euro member with non-member states are not reported to save space. In order to mitigate this noise problem Table 6 tests for similarity of means of trade flows among four mutually exclusive groups of pairs of countries -the three groups identified in Table 5 and the default group (pairs with at least one non-euro country). The statistics for the default group are provided separately for the large dataset of 22 countries and for the small EU14 dataset (the statistics for the other three groups are identical in the two datasets of course). Table 6 shows that not all tests clearly reject the null hypothesis of similar means between the groups. For trade levels in the large dataset the null cannot be rejected when Conveniently the mean for Group 1 (pairs of non-Med countries) is the highest of all groups and the mean for Group 3 (pairs of Med countries) is the lowest of all groups. Table 7 runs simultaneous quantile regressions with the average value of the log of trade during 1999-2011 as a dependent variable using the small EU14 dataset. Each two columns boxed together show results from a single regression targeting two symmetric quantiles. The first two columns target tertiles, the next two columns target the two extreme quartiles and the last two columns target the two extreme deciles. These are cross-section regressions so there are no fixed effects, hence the gravity equations' bilateral variables are specified. Exporter Country and Importer Country Fixed Effects replace respectively the EYFE and IYFE that are specified in the previous regressions.
The Single Market dummies are not specified as all countries were member states throughout the period (and the Single Market index collapses into a Single Market dummy in cross-section). The dummies for the euro area are similar to those used in Table 3 . Table 7 shows a euro effect on trade between pairs of euro area countries, which is stronger at the low tail of the distribution of trade compared with the high tail (see top row), although inter-quantile regressions (not shown) confirmed that these differences are statistically significant only in some of the columns. The magnitude of the euro effect in the low quantiles is much larger than that estimated in Table 5 and Table 3 . Even when the regression targets the median of trade the coefficient of the dummy for pairs of two euro area member states is 1.64 and highly significant (not shown in Table 7 ). This magnitude of the euro effect is less reliable than other estimates in this study because it is based on a cross section and on trade levels. However, the striking differences in Table 7 between the euro effect on low and high traders, and the identification in Table 6 of the Meds with low trade and the non-Meds with high trade supports the trends identified in Table 5 . Furthermore, while the estimates in Table 5 
Conclusions
This study finds that the euro's introduction provided little stimulus to trade before its notes and coins were introduced, but that later it at least doubled trade among its users, even when the crisis years after 2008 are considered. The euro also increased trade with third parties. The lack of a euro's effect before the euro started to circulate is compatible with Baldwin's argument that the euro mainly enhances variety-driven trade by lowering the fixed costs of cross-border trade, rather than lower transaction costs. Since consumers and small businesses handle cash relatively more than large firms, for many of them the euro was not a reality before they began preparing for the introduction of its notes and coins in 2002. The findings also explain why it was so far so hard to properly detect the euro's effect: it was much more gradual and fitful than anticipated. Region-sensitive estimation shows that the euro area stimulated trade among all of its member states, but especially among the Mediterranean countries. This finding provides further support to Baldwin's argument, given that these economies are characterized by small firms.
On a technical level this study demonstrates the importance of selecting the appropriate countries and years for the dataset when estimating the euro's effect, the importance of controlling for trade with third parties, proper treatment of the gravity equations' omitted variables problem, proper control for the effects of the Single Market, and the use of unidirectional trade flows rather than bilateral average flows. While some studies of the euro's effect considered some of these issues, none have treated them simultaneously. This study makes additional improvements to the exiting literature on the trade effects of the euro by estimating differences of trade, by studying the separate effects of the euro on different member states and by using quantile regression.
The results of this study are evidence that micro-economically the euro works in spite of its macro-economic difficulties. To the extent the euro remains a politically desirable project the results of this study strengthen the case for saving it. However, important questions remain. First, the intermittent pattern of the euro's effect over the years deserves further study. The existing literature has provided mostly microeconomic explanations for the euro effect, but the microeconomic benefits of a currency cannot be enjoyed without being exposed to its macroeconomic effects; scholars interested in the former must better control for the latter. Second, if the euro was launched by countries that had a tendency to trade less than their potential according to the gravity model, as suggested in the small EU14 dataset in Table 4 , then the estimates in this study of the euro's effect on trade represent a floor; further analysis is required to distill the full trade effect of the euro.
Third, if the euro is especially beneficial for the Mediterranean countries what are the implications for the distribution of monetary power in Europe (the ability to shift the external adjustment burden onto other countries)? The greater trade among the Mediterranean countries does not support the notion that the euro empowered mostly the Coordinated Market Economies (CME) (Vermeiren, 2013) . If any, the stimulus that it provided for small business should strengthen Mediterranean mixed market economies.
Some of the enhanced Mediterranean trade was arguably driven by looser credit in the 2000s but that effect was global, not euro-specific, and Table 7 shows that the Med trade effect is evident even when the crisis years (when the credit was withdrawn) are taken into account. Of course the findings of this study in themselves are not sufficient to reject the CME-domination argument but the literature on the Varieties of Capitalism should consider them.
Fourth, further research is needed into the domestic political economy of the euro's effect on trade. If small firms are the great winners from the euro can we expect 'big business' to be less influential? Will this have implications for the balance of political influence among regions in Europe? A sense that the euro is in the long term spreading prosperity may enhance political support for it by public opinion, which is a crucial element for the long run sustainability of EMU. Unfortunately the domestic political economy of the euro's effect on trade is beyond the scope of this study but it certainly deserves a serious study.
